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FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS STATUTES AND
MOORE v. DEMPSEY
J. S. WATERMAN* AND E. E. OVERTONt
I
T HE importance of Moore et al. v. Dempsey, Keeper of Arkansas State
Penitentiary, a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States'
on "due process in procedure" may be measured by its appearance in
three recent case-books on constitutional law and one on federal jurisdic-
tion.3 Yet in the discussions of the case the procedural stages under the
federal statutes in this habeas corpus proceeding have often been recount-
ed incorrectly, in that it has been said "the application to the United
States district court for a writ of habeas corpus was denied. ' ' 4
In fact the writ of habeas corpus was issued by the federal district judge,
though he disqualified himself for the hearing. When it was held, another
district judge, who was assigned to sit, sustained the "demurrer" of the
state of Arkansas and discharged the writ.' On appeal6 the Supreme
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' 26r U.S. 86, 43 Sup. Ct. 265, 67 L. Ed. 543'(X923). This was a case arising out of the
"Elaine Riots" in Phillips County, Arkansas, i9ig, wherein petitioners, negroes, convicted of
murder by the State Court, allege that the trial was one in form only and that they were hurried
to conviction under mob pressure without regard for their rights and without due process of
law.
2McGovney, Cases on Constitutional Law (1930), 591; Rottschaefer, Cases on Constitu-
tional Law (1932), 577; Dodd, Cases on Constitutional Law (1932), 1177.
Frankfurter & Katz, Cases on Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure (1931), 487.
4 Evans, Cases on Constitutional Law (2nd ed. 1925), 979 n. See also Note, 9 Va. L. Rev.
556, 557 (1923). The usual description of the proceedings in this case in the district court is
that "upon demurrer the District Court dismissed the petition." Note, 33 Yale L. Jour. 82
(1923). This is misleading, unless it is stated that the petition for the writ was granted though
the writ was discharged at the hearing on demurrer. Infra, note 37.
5 Law Record "NV," Western Division, Eastern District of Arkansas, United States District
Court, Little Rock, Arkansas, pp. 2-7. Acknowledgment is made to J. S. Utley, Attorney Gen-
eral of Arkansas, 1921-1925, for much factual information appearing in this article.
6 For direct appeals in habeas corpus proceedings before 1925 from the district court to the
Supreme Court: Zoline, Federal Appellate Procedure (2nd ed. 1924), § 519. For the present
statute governing appeals: 27 Stat. 751 (1893), 43 Stat. 940 (1925), 28 U.S.C.A. § 464 (1928).
For certiorari to circuit court of appeals: Dobie, Federal Procedure (1928), § 2x3.
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
Court ordered a hearing in which the district court was to determine the
facts as to mob domination of the state trial court. This second hearing
ordered by the Supreme Court was never held, as the death sentence which
the petitioners received in the state court was afterwards commuted to
twelve years by the governor of Arkansas.7
A number of law review comments have already treated the many as-
pects of this case, which involve constitutional law,8 federal appellate pro-
cedure, 9 and federal interference with state criminal trials.-0 It is not with-
in the purview of this article to review the various questions raised in these
notes nor will it confine its discussion to the opinion of the Supreme Court
as has been the rule in the treatment of this case. This article will deal
with the federal statutes on habeas corpus x and will approach the case by
considering the several stages in the proceedings before the district court.
I
Why did the judge, who disqualified himself for the hearing, grant the
writ of habeas corpus to the petitioners?12 A brief historical sketch of the
purpose of the writ and the nature of the proceedings in granting it may
aid in answering the question.
A habeas corpus proceeding is "a collateral attack of a civil nature to
impeach the validity of a judgment or sentence of another court in a
criminal proceeding."'' 3 Historically14 the petition for a writ of habeas
Arkansas Gazette, Nov. 4, 1923, P. 1: '. Subsequently the six prisoners were indefinitely
furloughed after serving less than six years in the penitentiary. Information in letters as to the
records of State Penitentiary, Little Rock,, Arkansas. See also Waterman and Overton, The
Aftermath of Moore v. Dempsey, i8 St. Louis L. Rev. 117, 122 (x933).
8 Notes: 73 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 430, 431, n. 10 (X924); 7 N.C.L. Rev. 179 (X929); 7 Minn.
L. Rev. 513 (1923); 37 Harv. L. Rev. 247 (1923).
9 Note, 33 Yale L. Jour. 82, 84, n. 13 (1923). Cf. the recent"Scottsboro case" which came
before the Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari, infra, note 5o.
10 Note, 9 Va. L. Rev. 556, 558 (1923). Cf. 44 Harv. L. Rev. 447, 448 (1930). Mr. Justice
McReynolds said in 261 U.S. at 93, in the minority opinion: "The delays incident to enforce-
ment of our criminal laws have become a national scandal and give serious alarm to those who
observe." See also 2 Warren, Supreme Court in U.S. History (rev. ed. 1932), 99; Dobie, op.
cit., sizpra note 6, 31o; Trieber, The Relationship of State and National Courts, 42 Am. L.
Rev. 321, 326 (19o8).
"1 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 451-466 (1928). For a history of federal habeas corpus statutes'see Frank-
furter & Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts, 37 Harv. L. Rev.
IoIO, 1082 (1923). Note, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 204 (1907); 2 Warren, op. cit., supra note io, 687 n.
12 Rev. Stat. § 753, 28 U.S.C.A. § 453 (i928).
'3 Ex parte Frederich, 149 U.S. 70, 76, 13 Sup. Ct. 793, 37 L. Ed. 653, 657 (1893). On col-
lateral attack by habeas corpus "for lack of jurisdiction," see 39 L.R.A. 450, n. (b) (i898).
Dobie, op. c4t., supra note 6, 296.
X4 For historical accounts of the writ: 9 Holdsworth, The History of the English Law
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corpus ad subjiciendum,5 the writ discussed in this article, did not state a
cause of action against the custodian of the petitioner. The granting of
the writ on petition was a summary exercise of judicial power."6 In the
language of Blackstone, the writ was "a high prerogative" one,'17 the most
celebrated in the English law, and as the great remedy of citizens and
aliens against arbitrary or illegal punishment its efficacy depended upon
the speed with which the courts issued it.' As immediate judicial inter-
ference was often necessary, the writ was granted on the facts set out in
the petition without inquiry into their truth. The custodian of the prison-
er, really the state, had a day in court when the return, which set forth the
true cause of the detention, was passed on at the summary hearing. Nor
were the technical rules of pleading applicable in habeas corpus proceed-
ings.9
Under the federal statutes the district judge, though he deemed him-
self disqualified to sit at the hearing, did not have to pass on the truth
of the allegations in the petition.20 As correctly stated by Mr. Justice
Pitney in Frank v. Mangun,2 a case in which the district court denied the
(1926), io8-i25; Taswell-Langmead, English Constitutional History (2nd ed. i88o), 623-628;
Fox, Contempt of Court (1927), viii. Consider the function of the writ of habeas corpus in
England and in federal courts at a time when "there was no satisfactory method of reviewing
criminal cases in England until 1907" and when "for a full hundred years there was no right of
appeal to the Supreme Court in criminal cases." Morgan, The Study of Law (1926), 18;
Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court (1928), 1a9. See also 3 Fed. Stat.
Ann., 164; Countryman, The Supreme Court and its Appellate Power (1913), 1O4-110; 2
Tucker, Constitution of U.S. (I899), § 385; 2 Warren, op. cit., supra note 10, 464, 474, 687;
Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. (U.S.) 5o6, i9 L. Ed. 264 (1869).
It seems certain that the power of review by writ of error vested in the Supreme Court of
the United States in 1889 over death sentences of a federal court, resulted from the peculiar
jurisdiction and numerous death sentences of the federal court of the western district of
Arkansas. Daily, Judge Isaac C. Parker, Rep. Bar Ass'n. Ark. (1932), 88, 99; Rev. Stat.
(1874), 88 533, 571, 2145, 2146. The act of 1889, introduced by Senator James K. Jones of
Arkansas, in its original form provided for a review by the Supreme Court in capital offenses
solely from the western district of Arkansas. 5o Cong. Rec. 5611, 7636 (1888); ibid. 1713
(i889). See also 25 Stat. 655 (i889).
is3 Bl. Comm., *131.
16 Notes: 15 Harv. L. Rev. 76 (190o); 37 Harv. L. Rev. 774 (1923).
17 For the Blackstonian origin of the term "high prerogative writ," see Jenks, The Preroga-
tive Writ in English Law, 32 Yale L. Jour. 523, 533 (1923).
18 2 Kent, Comm. (4th ed. 184o), *31; 9 Holdsworth, op. cit., supra note 14, Z18; Rawle,
Constitution (2nd ed. 1829), 117.
'9 Simmons v. Georgia Iron & Coal Co., 17 Ga. 305,43 S.E. 780, 61 L.R.A. 739 (19o3). For
pleadings in law trials in the federal courts see Dobie, op. cit., supra note 6, § 148.
2- Rev. Stat. § 755, 28 U.S.C.A. § 455 (i928).
2' 237 U.S. 309, 35 Sup. Ct. 582, 59 L. Ed. 969 (905).
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application for a writ: "The district court having considered the case upon
the face of the petition, we must do the same, treating it as if demurred to
by the sheriff." 22 Mr. Justice Holmes in the minority opinion in that case
stated the issue more accurately when he said: "The only question before
us is whether the petition shows on its face that the writ of habeas corpus
should be denied, or whether the district court should have proceeded to
try the facts. '23
As has been said in more detail:
It may be assumed .... that the petition states all facts helpful to the prisoner.
I greatly doubt whether a formal demurrer is necessary or proper in a case heard on a
petition and an order to show cause why the writ should not issue. In view of the Re-
vised Statutes, Sec. 755,24 it is, I think, sufficient if the respondent orally demurs, or
what amounts to the same thing, suggests to the court that the petition does not state
a case entitling the petitioner to the writ. This was, apparently, the course followed in
Leo M. Frank's Case, 237 U.S. 309, 35 S. Ct. 582, 59 L. Ed. 96g, and is the general
practice in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 'Under Section 755, Re-
vised Statutes, it was the duty of the court to refuse the writ if it appeared from the
petition itself that the appellant was not entitled to it.' Pitney, J., Frank's Case,
supra. To the same effect, aside from any statute was the opinion of Shaw, C. J., in
Sim's Case, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 285, 293. 2
The practice, which the federal statutes incorporated,26 has been to
award the writ of habeas corpus on the petition. The custodian of the
prisoner sets out the true cause of the detention in the return,' 7 and the
return and the petition are considered at the summary hearing after the
writ has been awarded.?'
As Mr. Justice Wilmot in 1758, in an opinion on the writ of habeas
corpus, said before the House of Lords:
The check upon the Writ, by requiring a probable cause to be shewn before it issues,
is only saying 'shew you want redress, and you shall have it:' and if a person cannot
disclose such a Case himself, as to shew he is aggrieved when he tells his own story, and
is not opposed or contradicted by anybody; it is decisive against his being in such a
condition as to want Relief .....
"237 U.S. 309, 332, 35 Sup. Ct. 582, 589 (i915). Cf. 9 Va. L. Rev. 556, 558 (1923).
23 237 U.S. 309, 345, 35 Sup. Ct. 582, 594 (i905)-
'4 Rev. Stat. § 755, 28 U.S.C.A. § 455 (i928). "Where the application is made to the court,
the court has power to make an order absolute ex parle for the writ to issue in the first instance,
or to grant an order nisi." io Halsbury, Laws of England (1931), § 126.
25 Horn v. Mitchell, 223 Fed. 549, 55o (D. Mass. i915); affd. in 232 Fed. 81g (C.C.A. ist
igi6); app. dism. 243 U.S. 247,37 Sup. Ct. 293, 6i L. Ed. 700 (917). This excerpt also appears
in n. 3 to 28 U.S.C.A. §455 (1928), and in 29 C. J. 148, n. 6i.
26 Rev. Stat. § 755, 28 U.S.C.A. § 455 (i928).
'7 Rev. Stat. § 757, 28 U.S.C.A. § 457 (1928).
28 Rev. Stat. § 761, 28 U.S.C.A. § 461 (1928); Dobie, op. cit., supra note 6, § 83.
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Careful as the Law is to prevent this Writ from being abused, it cannot always pre-
vent it: for if a man does not disclose the whole Case, it may issue sometimes where it
would not have issued, if the Case had been fairly stated.29
I hope we shall never see any Chief Justice, especially in the great court of criminal process,
the King's Bench, who shall deny, or delay, the issuing of one of these writs (of habeas corpus)
to any man who applies for it, but award the same instantly, upon the prayer of anyone, as a
writ of right, to which the subject is entitled upon asking, by motion of course, without any
affidavit whatsoever. In many cases, as for example, in that of 'close' confinement, it may be
impossible for the party either to speak with a friend, send a letter, or make an affidavit; and
consequently, if either be required by the court, it will be a virtual denial of the writ; it is a
means of defeating the Habeas Corpus Act. The requisition of an affidavit, puts it likewise in
the power of the judge, to object to its form or contents, and to say the same is not full enough.
This passage appeared in the famous pamphlet published by John Almon in 1764, in which
Lord Mansfield was accused of having introduced a method of proceeding which deprived the
subject of the benefit of the Habeas Corpus Act. The King v. Almon (1765), ibid. 248, n. (a).
Dicey, in a fairly modern work, has said of the granting of the writ:
, the Court or a judge should and will always cause it to be issued on being sat-
isfied by affidavit that there is reason to suppose a prisoner to be wrongfully deprived
of his liberty .... that is to say, the Court will always issue it if primafacie ground is
shown [in the petition] for supposing that the person on whose behalf it is asked for is
unlawfully deprived of his liberty.3o
In view of the function of the writ of habeas corpus, it is believed that
the district judge could consistently grant the writ on the basis of the
allegations in the petition of mob domination of the trial court, even
though no reference was made to lack of corrective process in the trial and
appellate courts, and then disqualify himself for the hearing. Taking the
allegations as true, since they appeared in the petition, it was his opinion
that there was reasonable cause to believe that the petitioners were as a
matter of law denied their federal right of "due process in procedure" and
thus held in custody in violation of the federal constitution.
III
Since the facts alleged in the petition in Moore v. Dempsey were correctly
treated by the district judge as if demurred to, when he passed on the ap-
plication for a writ, why did the attorney-general of Arkansas demur at
the hearing?
Though the state filed a "demurrer to the petition," and prayed that
the petition be dismissed 3oa the demurrer is more properly described as a
motion to discharge the writ.3b Had the custodian deemed the allegations
29 Wilmot, Notes of Opinions and Judgments (1802), 77, 92.
soLaw of the Constitution (8th ed. 1931), 211.
3oa Transcript of Record (filed October 24, 1921), X20.
3ob Cf. Capone v. Aderhold, 2 F. Supp. 280 (D.C. Ga. 1933), app.dism. 65 F. (2d) 23o (C.
C.A. 5 th 1933). The court read the petition, immediately granted it and issued a writ. The re-
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in the petition sufficient to warrant the discharge of the prisoners, a return
would have been filed instead of such a motion. 3r
As has been stated:
But we know of no law which authorizes either the person against whom the writ is
prayed, or any one else, to come into court and object to the issuance of the writ .....
It is a matter'to be determined solely by the judge. And even after the writ has issued,
and the respondent has appeared in answer to it, the sufficiency of the petition [to
justify the issuance of the writ] can not be tested by a demurrer, though it seems that
a motion may be made to quash the writ because of insufficient averments in the pe-
tition.32
At this point it becomes necessary to discuss Frank v. Mangum33 as it
was the principle of law which counsel for the state of Arkansas adduced
from that case upon which they relied3 4 Here were two cases in which
petitioners sought by a writ of habeas corpus under the federal statutes to
stay their execution by alleging mob domination of a state trial court and
failure of the state courts to correct the wrong done them.
In Frank v. Mangum the petitioner had set out, as appears in the opin-
ion of the Supreme Court, a very strong case of mob domination of the
spondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition for insufficiency appearing on its face and a
hearing was held on this motion, the facts in the petition being taken as true. The court then
"dismissed the petition," discharged the writ, and remanded the petitioner to custody.
Since the petition was granted and the writ of habeas corpus issued, the motion of the re-
spondent to dismiss the petition for insufficiency in law appearing on its face, was really a mo-
tion to discharge the writ and not one to dismiss the petition. The petitioner contended that
the motion of the respondent to dismiss the petition raised a moot question as the court had
already held the petition sufficient to justify the issuance of the writ.
The court said of the contention of the petitioner: "the claim seems to be that the issuance
of the writ ipso facto precludes any attack upon the legal sufficiency of the petition by motion
to dismiss." It was held in effect that after a writ of habeas corpus has been issued the legal
sufficiency of the petition may be tested on motion to discharge the writ, and the court treated
the motion of the respondent as such, despite the fact the court described it as a motion to dis-
miss the petition.
3x The application for the writ should contain, in part, "the facts concerning the detention
of the party restrained, in whose custody he is detained, and by virtue of what claim of author-
ity, if known." Rev. Stat. § 754, 28 U.S.C.A. § 454 (i928). The return should contain the true
cause of detention. Rev. Stat. § 757, 28 U.S.C.A. § 457 (1928). Clark, Criminal Procedure
(2nd ed. 19i8), 66o.
To the effect that the return, under certain conditions, was conclusive under the federal
statutes, see 237 U.S. at 330, 15 A. & E. Enc. Law 197. See also 9 Holdsworth, op. cit., supra
note 14, 12o; Hallam, Const. Hist. of England (sth ed. 1876), 5oi; Schley, Digest (1826), 276,
n.; Wilmot, op. cit., supra note 29, io6.
32 Simmons v. Ga. Iron & Coal Co., 117 Ga. 305,43 S.E. 780, 783, 61 L.R.A. 739, 742 (1903).
See also Addis v. Applegate, 171 Iowa x5o, 163, 154 N.W. 168, 173 Ann. C as. 1917 E 332, 337
(i915); In re Taylor, Fed. Cas. No. 13,774 (1879); 12 R.C.L. X235. See infra note 74.
33 Supra, note 21.
34 This information has been gathered by letters from counsel for the State of Arkansas.
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trial court.3 S Yet both the district court in Georgia and the Supreme Court
of the United States thought that the petitioner was not entitled to a writ
and therefore not to a later hearing. To counsel for Arkansas, the petition
in Moore v. Dempsey certainly made no stronger allegation of mob domina-
tion of the trial court than did Frank's petition.3
6
It was the opinion of counsel for the state of Arkansas that the Frank
case stood for this principle: if a petition in a federal court for a writ of
habeas corpus alleges mob domination of a trial court, which allegation is
to be taken as true, a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted if corrective
trial or appellate process is afforded by the state. That is, to counsel for
Arkansas under the holding in the Frank case, the petitioners had not as a
matter of law set forth sufficient allegations to warrant the court in dis-
charging them. Accordingly, the attorney-general of Arkansas demurred,
or in effect moved to discharge the writ, as in his opinion Arkansas had
afforded the corrective process required by Frank v. Mangum.
Iv
In sustaining the demurrer, the court had to hold at the hearing either
that the facts alleged were not sufficient to justify a conclusion of mob
domination,37 a conclusion difficult to reach in view of the narrative set
forth in the petition, or else that mob domination of a state criminal trial
did not amount to a deprivation of due process where there was proper
corrective trial and appellate process. Whichever view the court took at
the hearing, even though it discharged the writ, it held there was probable
cause for appeal and so certified35
3 73 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 430, 431 (1924) states that the Supreme Court held that there was
not sufficient evidence of mob violence in Frank v. Mangum.
36 Mott, Due Process of Law (1926), 558, n. 52, states that a much more flagrant case of
mob violence was presented in Moore v. Dempsey than in Frank v. Mangum. A news des-
patch, perhaps not self serving, from the county seat of Phillips County, Arkansas, where the
trials were held, in the Arkansas Gazette, Nov. 6, 1919, i, a conservative and usually accurate
journal reads:
"The most remarkable feature of the trials now in progress is the apparent lack of interest
locally. At no time since the insurrection cases were called on Monday, (November 3, I919)
has the courtroom been filled. Many persons are in attendance because they have been sum-
moned as witnesses and some are attending the daily sessions to gratify curiosity, but the at-
tendance is far less than expected and the verdicts are accepted without comment." See also
58 Cong. Rec. 88ig (19i9).
37 Mr. Justice McReynolds said in the minority opinion:
" .... the District Judge held the alleged facts insufficient primnafacie to show the nullity of
the original judgment ..... With all these things before him, I am unable to say that the Dis-
trict Judge .... erred when he held the petition for the writ of habeas corpus insufficient."
261 U.S. at 93 and xoi. See supra, note 4.
38 35 Stat. 40 (1908), 43 Stat. 940, 942 (1925), 28 U.S.C.A. § 466 (1928). See 5 Sacco-Van-
zetti Case (1929), 5534, where the district judge refused to certify there was probable cause for
an appeal when he denied the application for a writ of habeas corpus.
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Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the majority of the court, began his
opinion with these words: "The case stated by the petition is as follows,
and it will be understood that while we put it in narrative form, we are not
affirming the facts to be as stated, but only what we must take them to be,
as they are admitted by the demurrer." 39 At the end of the opinion, Mr.
Justice Holmes said if "the facts" alleged are true "they make the trial
absolutely void.' ' 40 As will be shown, the words "the facts" refer to allega-
tions of mob domination rather than mob domination and lack of correc-
tive process. The Supreme Court thus disposed of one of the questions
before the district court when it held that the facts as alleged amounted to
mob domination. If these allegations in this petition justified the Supreme
Court in concluding that mob domination existed, did not the allegations
in Frank's petition warrant a similar conclusion?
But why did not Mr. Justice Holmes follow the holding in the majority
opinion of Frank v. Mangum, which reads:
We, of course, agree that if a trial is in fact dominated by a mob, so that the jury is
intimidated and the trial judge yields, and so that there is an actual interference with
the course of justice, there is, in that court, a departure from due process of law in the
proper sense of that term. And if the state, supplying no corrective process, carries into
execution a judgment of death or imprisonment based upon a verdict thus produced by
mob domination, the state deprives the accused of his life or liberty without due process
of law.4
The corrective process in Arkansas on appeal in criminal cases gives the
state supreme court power to pass only on errors of law appearing on the
record. 42 But this includes errors in overruling a motion for a new trial.43
New trials, upon the defendant's motion, may be granted when a verdict
is rendered against the defendant by which his substantial rights have
been prejudiced, where from any cause the court is of the opinion that the
defendant has not received a fair and impartial trial.44 The Arkansas
statutes further provide that in all cases where the defendant has been
convicted of a capital offense, all errors of the lower court prejudicial to the
rights of the appellant shall be considered by the supreme court whether
exceptions were saved in the lower court or not.45 By construction it has
been held, however, that exceptions must be made in the lower court
39 261 U.S. 86, 87, 43 Sup. Ct. 265 (1923).
40 261 U.S. 86, 92, 43 Sup. Ct. 265, 267 (1923).
4' 237 U.S. 309, 335, 35 Sup. Ct. 582, 590 (1915).
42 Ark. Dig. Stat. (Crawford, 1921) § 3413. Cf. 37 Harv. L. Rev. 247, 248, n. 15 (1923).
43 Ark. Dig. Stat. (Crawford, 1921) § 3413.
44 Ibid. § 3219. 45 Ibid. § 3414.
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though not saved and must also be incorporated in the motion for a hew
trial.46
The Supreme Court said of the corrective process in Moore v. Dempsey:
In this case a motion for a new trial on the ground alleged in this petition was over-
ruled, and upon exceptions and appeal to the Supreme Court the judgment was
affirmed.4 The Supreme Court said that the complaint of discrimination against pe-
titioners by the exclusion of colored men from the jury came too late,48 and, by way of
answer to the objection that no fair trial could be had in the circumstances, stated that
it could not say 'that this must necessarily have been the case';49 that eminent counsel
was appointed to defend the petitioners,50 that the trial was had according to law, the
jury correctly charged, and the testimony legally sufficient.st
Mr. Justice Holmes did not state that the corrective process in Arkansas
in criminal cases was defective nor that the corrective process of Georgia
was superior to that of Arkansas.s2 He did say this about the holding in
Frank v. Manguin on corrective process:
We assume in accordance with that case [Frank v. Mangum] that the corrective
process supplied by the State may be so adequate that interference by habeas corpus
ought not to be allowed ..... But if the case is that the whole proceeding is a mask
.... and that the State Courts failed to correct the wrong, . . . . perfection in the
46 Allen v. State, x75 Ark. 264, 298 S.W. 993 (1927); Sullivan v. State, 161 Ark. 19, 257
S.W. 58 (1923). See Hicks v. State, 143 Ark. 158, 16o, 220 S.W. 308,309 (1920), for the refusal
of the Arkansas Supreme Court to consider the exclusion of negroes from the panel of the petit
jury because the question was first raised in a motion for a new trial and not previously objected
to. Cf. Riddle v. Dyche, 262 U.S. 333, 43 Sup. Ct. 555, 67 L. Ed. 009 (1923).
47 Hicks v. State, 143 Ark. 158, 220 S.W. 308 (1920).
48 Supra, note 46. Cf. Ware v. State, 146 Ark. 321, 225 S.W. 626 (1920), where six other de-
fendants sentenced to death because of the same race conflict were granted a third trial because
negroes were systematically excluded from the panel of the petit jury. The objection in this
trial was properly made.
49 143 Ark. 158, 162, 220 S.W. 308, 309 (1920).
so Powell et al v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 Sup. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 78 (1932). A writ of certi-
orari to the state supreme court was granted in this case. Notes: 81 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 337
(1933); 19 Va. L. Rev. 293 (933); 13 Bost. Univ. L. Rev. 92 (1933). Cf. the refusal of a writ of
certiorari in Moore v. Arkansas, 254 U.S. 630, 41 Sup. Ct. 7, 65 L. Ed. 447 (7920); Dunn v.
Louisiana, 273 U.S. 656, 47 Sup. Ct. 344, 7 L. Ed. 825 (1927).
72 26z U.S. 86, 91, 43 Sup. Ct. 265, 267 (1923).
52 Mott, tce. cit., supra, note 36, says, without authority to be found in Moore v. Dempsey,
that the corrective appellate process in Arkansas was obviously inadequate, while that in
Georgia was adequate.
In Moore v. Dempsey, the Court based its decision not on any specific procedural irregu-
larities, but on a general impression of mob domination. Note, 32 Col. L. Rev. 1430, 1431
,
(932). Cf. Haines, The Revival of the Natural Law of Concepts (1930), 218 n., for a similar
observation. See also 46 Harv. L. Rev. 367, 381 (933).
Mr. Justice Pitney stated that the Georgia corrective process was adequate; see 237 U.S.
309, 335, 35 Sup. Ct. 582, 590 (7915). For the state appeals in the Frank case, see 741 Ga. 243,
go S.E. io16 (1974); 742 Ga. 617, 83 S.E. 233 (1974); 742 Ga. 741, 83 S.E. 645 (914).
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machinery for correction .... can [not] prevent this Court from securing to the pe-
titioners their constitutional rights.s3
It seems that Mr. justice Holmes held that perfection of the machinery
of corrective process is not sufficient to satisfy the federal right54 of "due
process in procedure." According to him, to furnish due process the state
courts must correct the wrong. In short, the statement of Mr. justice
Holmes in the minority opinion in Frank v. Mangum became the view of
the majority in Moore v. Dempsey. This statement was:
If the petition discloses facts that amount to a loss of jurisdiction in the trial court,
jurisdiction could not be restored by any decision above.ss
Therefore it seems that Moore v. Dempsey laid down a principle of law,
different from that adduced from Frank v. Mangum by counsel for the
state of Arkansas. This principle is that mob domination of a criminal
trial in a state court amounts to such a denial of due process in procedure
as to deprive the trial court of jurisdiction even though corrective process
is afforded. 56
vi
But why then did not the Supreme Court order the petitioners to be
discharged in view of the fact that the state demurred to the petition? It
did not do this but instead said:
.... it does not seem to us sufficient to allow a Judge of the United States to escape
the duty of examining the facts for himself, when, if true as alleged they make the trial
absolutely void. We have confined the statement to facts admitted by the demurrer.
We will not say that they cannot be met, but it appears to us unavoidable that the
District Judge should find whether the facts alleged are true and whether they can be
explained so far as to leave the state proceedings undisturbed.
Order reversed. The case to stand for hearing before the District Court.7
s 3 Supra, note 51.
54 Cf. Schofield, Federal Courts and Mob Domination of the State Courts, io Ill. L. Rev.
478, 504 (1916). See also Note, 7 Minn. L. Rev. 513 (1923).
55 237 U.S. 309, 348, 35 Sup. Ct. 582, 595 (I915). Mr. Justice Pitney answered this state-
ment of Mr. Justice Holmes in 237 U.S. 309, 336, 35 Sup. Ct. 582, 590 (1915).
The only questions that can be examined (by a writ of habeas corpus) are whether the court
has jurisdiction of the case, and whether the sentence rendered was within its power. Clark,
op. cit., supra, note 3 I, 655.
26 37 Harv. L. Rev. 247, 248 (1923); I3 Bost. Univ. L. Rev. 92, 97 (1933); Mathews, The
American Constitutional System (1932), 392 n. 2. See however, Diunn v. Lyons, 23 F. (2d) 14(C.C.A. 5th 1928); cert. den. 276 U.S. 622, 48 Sup. Ct. 305, 72 L. Ed. 736 (1928).
Mr. Justice McReynolds in 26x U.S. at 93, in the minority opinion, said: "I cannot agree
now to put it (the doctrine of Frank v. Mangum) aside and substitute the views expressed by
the minority of the court in that cause." In Downer v. Dunaway, 53 F. (2d) 586 (C.C.A. 5th
1931), 1 F. Supp. iooi (D.C. Ga. 1932), the petitioner was discharged, because of mob domina-
tion, though no use was made of the corrective process. Note 32 Col. L. Rev. 740 (1932).
57 s6i U.S. 86, 92, 43 Sup. Ct. 265, 267 (1923).
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From this one may infer that if a writ of habeas corpus is properly
granted on the face of the petition, a hearing by the district court to de-
termine the facts must be held and the writ is not to be discharged on
motion. If such a properly granted writ is dismissed, on appeal the Su-
preme Court will not order the discharge of the prisoners even though the
state does not deny the facts set out in the petition but will require that
the district court determine if the facts alleged are true.
vii
Attempts have been made to prove that the holdings of Frank v. Man-
gum and Moore v. Dempsey are consistent58 The petitions in both cases,
however, set forth narratives which show mob domination of the trial
court. In both cases, the narratives had to be taken as true, as in one the
petition was treated as if demurred to and in the other the state filed a
"demurrer to the petition." Therefore to distinguish the two cases be-
cause a demurrer was filed in one and not in the other is incorrect.59 Nor
can any distinction be drawn between the two cases on the corrective
process furnished by the two states." If such a distinction could have been
made, the Supreme Court did not make it in Moore v. Dempsey. Such dif-
ference then as exists between the two cases does not rest on the allega-
tion of mob domination or the proof of its existence, on demurrer, or on
corrective process.
viii
Certain observations of Mr. Justice Pitney in the majority opinion in
Frank v. Mangum show that at times he seemed confused as to the proce-
dural stage reached in the district court under the federal statutes. It is
believed, despite the fact Mr. Justice Pitney stated6' that the district
court considered the case only on the petition and accompanying affi-
davits as if demurred to, that he discussed at some points the proceedings
in the federal district court of Georgia as if they were a hearing on the
facts after a writ had been granted. For example, with veiled irritation
and perhaps disapproval, he said several times that Frank had withheld
from his petition evidence and "rebutting affidavits submitted in behalf
of the state. ' '62 But as Mr. Justice Holmes said in his dissenting opinion
in the case, the petition sets forth "the strongest indications of the facts at
ss Mott, loc. cit., supra, note 36; 9 Va. L. Rev. 556, 558 (1923).
9 37 Harv. L. Rev. 247, 248 (1923).
60 See supra, note 52.
'237 U.S. 309, 332, 35 Sup. Ct. 582, 589 (1915).
"237 U.S. 309, 333, 336, 344, 35 Sup. Ct. 582, 589, 590, 594 (1915).
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the petitioner's command" and it "did not need to set forth contradictory
evidence, or matters of rebuttal. ' '63
Since the right of a petitioner to a writ of habeas corpus depends on the
case which he makes in the application, it clearly does not seem, either
historically or under the federal statute,64 the office of the petition to sum-
marize all the evidence presented by the state in the state courts when
they pass on a motion for a new trial.64a
Another statement of Mr. Justice Pitney also deserves notice. It reads:
.... we hold that such a determination of the facts as was thus made by the court
of last resort of Georgia respecting the alleged interference with the trial through dis-
order and manifestation of hostile sentiment cannot, in this collateral inquiry, be
treated as a nullity, but must be taken as setting forth the truth of the matter; certain-
ly until some reasonable ground is shown for an inference that the court which ren-
dered it either was wanting in jurisdiction, or at least erred in the exercise of its juris-
diction; and that the mere assertion by the prisoner that the facts of the matter are
other than the state court, upon full investigation, determined them to be, will not be
deemed sufficient to raise an issue respecting the correctness of that determination;
especially not, where the very evidence upon which the determination was rested is
withheld by him who attacks the finding.6s
Mr. Justice McReynolds in the minority opinion in Moore v. Dempsey
speaking of the hearing in the district court expressed a somewhat similar
idea, when he said:
.... I cannot agree that the solemn adjudications by courts of a great state, which
this court has refused to review,6sa can be successfully impeached by the mere ex parte
affidavits made upon information and belief of interested convicts joined by two white
men,-confessedly atrocious criminals.6
Assuming that the same facts set forth in the petition6 7 have been passed
on by the state courts, both trial and appellate, what effect should this
63 237 U.S. 309, 349, 35 Sup. Ct. 582, 595 (i915).
64 Rev. Stat. § 755, 28 U.S.C.A. § 455 (x928).
64 A writ of habeas corpus will not be quashed merely on the ground that the judge who
ordered it to issue abstained from inquiring into the facts .... especially if such facts might
properly be stated on the return nor for matter that can properly be returned to it. IO Hals-
bury, op. cit., supra, note 24, § 137.
6- 237 U.S. 309, 335-336, 35 Sup. Ct. 582, 590-591 (i915).
6sa Moore v. Arkansas, 254 U.S. 630,41 Sup. Ct. 7, 65 L. Ed. 447 (1920). See also Martineau
v. Arkansas, 257'U.S. 665, 42 Sup. Ct. 52, 66 L. Ed. 424 (1921).
6 261 U.S. 86, 102, 43 Sup. Ct. 265, 270 (1923).
67 See, however, 33 Yale L. Jour. 82, 84, n. 13 (1923), which alleges that certain additional
affidavits were before the Supreme Court, which the Arkansas state supreme court refused to
consider because the time had expired within which they should have been presented. It is
submitted that the authority for this statement does not appear in Hicksv. State, 143 Ark. 158,
220 S.W. 308 (1920), the case in which the trials of the petitioners in Moore v. Dempsey were
reviewed. See supra, note 46 for refusal of the Arkansas state supreme court to consider the
exclusion of the negroes from the panel of the petit jury because the objection was not made
at the proper time though raised in the motion for a new trial.
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have on the finding of facts at a hearing of the federal district court?
In the Frank case this stage under the federal statutes had not been
reached as the application for the writ was denied. Therefore this state-
ment of Mr. Justice Pitney in the Frank case was beside the point,-as the
finding of the state court as to the facts was never before the district court
because the facts alleged in the petition, according to Mr. Justice Pitney's
own statement, were to be taken as true.
If a hearing on facts had been held in either the Moore or the Frank
case, the findings of the Georgia appellate courts might have been more
persuasive than that of the Arkansas appellate court, for the Georgia
court said the "charges [were] untrue save in a few minor particulars not
amounting to more than irregularities, and not prejudicial to the ac-
cused" ;"5 while the Arkansas court said "we are unable, however, to say
that this [an unfair trial] must necessarily have been the case." 69
But as Mr. Justice Holmes stated in the minority opinion in the Frank
case in discussing granting a writ on the petition:
, we are speaking only of the case made by the petition, and whether it ought
to be heard. Upon allegations of this gravity in our opinion it ought to be heard, what-
ever the decision of the state court may have been, and it did not need to set forth con-
tradictory evidence, or matter of rebuttal, or to explain why the motion for a new trial
and to set aside the verdict were overruled by the state court.70
Therefore when an application for a writ of habeas corpus is presented
to a federal court the finding of facts by the state courts can not be a bind-
ing adjudication on the federal courts, for under the federal statutes the
allegations are to be taken as true. Where the writ is properly granted,
under the ruling of the Moore case, the petitioner is entitled to an inde-
pendent federal hearing to determine whether on the facts he has been de-
prived of a federal right, regardless of what the state courts might have
found the facts to be at their own hearings.7'
CONCLUSION
The discussion of Moore v. Dempsey usually treats of mob domination
of the trial court and of corrective process as bearing on "due process in
procedure," but it seems that the case stands for certain principles which
'8 237 U.S. 309, 338, 35 Sup. Ct. 582, 591 (1915); 37 Harv. L. Rev. 247, 248 (1923).
69 z43 Ark. r58, 62, 220 S.W. 308, 309 (192o) reads:
We are unable, however, to say that this (an unfair trial) must necessarily have been the
case. The trials were had according to the law, the jury was correctly charged as to the law of
the case, and the testimony legally sufficient to support the verdicts returned. We cannot,
therefore, in the face of this affirmative showing assume that the trial was an empty ceremony,
conducted for the purpose only of appearing to comply with the requirements of the law, when
they were not in fact complied with.
70 237 U.S. 309, 349, 35 Sup. Ct. 582, 595 (915).
7Cf. Notes: 37 Harv. L. Rev. 247, 249 (923); 33 Yale L. Jour. 82, 84 (1923).
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have been minimized. First, the Supreme Court of the United States will
not discharge prisoners held under a state sentence when the state de-
murs at the hearing on a properly granted writ of habeas corpus. Second,
the Supreme Court held that the federal statutes on habeas corpus must
be observed by the district court.
This second conclusion follows from the order in Moore v. Dempsey
which directed that a hearing be held to determine the facts.7 2 The federal
statute states, assuming of course that the petition on its face justified the
issuance of the writ, that at the second stage in habeas corpus proceedings
the "judge shall proceed in a summary way to determine the facts of the
case, by hearing the testimony." 73 This was the type of hearing ordered
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Moore v. Dempsey.74
TITLE I OF THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ACT'
MALCOLM P. SHARP*
W ORKERS and persons dealing with corporations, as well as stock-
holders, are of course affected by the policies of corporations' rulers.
The relationship may be developing a new theory of the position of these
rulers, modifying the traditional view that it is the stockholders' interests
alone that concern ordinary corporation managers. In the separate affairs
of a single corporation, indeed, it may be that stockholders' interests must
7To the effect that where the application for the writ is directed to the Supreme Court of
the United States, it was the common practice of that court to dispense with the hearing, see,
12 R.C.L. 1234; 3 Fed. Stat. Ann. 164.
73 Rev. Stat. § 761, 28 U.S.C.A. § 461 (1928). Mr. Justice Pitney in the majority opinion of
Frank v. Mangum said: "The effect (of the federal statutes on habeas corpus) is to substitute
for the bare legal review that seems to have been the limit of judicial authority under the com-
mon-law practice, and under the act of (i679) 31 Car. II C. 2, a more searching investigation,
in which the applicant is put upon his oath to set forth the truth of the matter respecting causes
of his detention, and the court, upon determining the actual facts, is to "dispose of the party as
law and justice requires." 237 U.S. 309, 331, 35 Sup. Ct. 582, 588-589 (1915).
74 261 U.S. 86, 92, 43 Sup. Ct. 265, 267 (1923).
Where objection is taken to the writ of habeas corpus on the ground that it was irregularly or
improperly issued .... the writ may be quashed upon application made to a divisional court
on motion for an order nisi; and the objection should not be raised on motion to discharge the
prisoner upon the return to the writ. io Halsbury, op. cit., snpra, note 24, § 137. Supra, note
32.
The writer's personal observations, first as a member of the law faculty of the University
of Wisconsin during the last six years; and second, as a member of the legal division of the Na-
tional Recovery Administration in-the summer of 1933, are the basis of this comment. The
text of this comment was completed October i8, 1933. Title II of the Act, not considered here,
deals with public works.
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, the University of Chicago Law School.
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continue to control, and that there will be only more careful definitions of
their rights and the rights of their corporations, in relation to managers.
On the other hand, it may be that the views of some of the more imagina-
tive industrial rulers will prevail; and that even the separate organiza-
tions of single corporations will reflect more and more, not only democratic
traditions, but elements from American and European theories of the
aristocrat's position.2 With opportunities for cooperation among business
units, moreover, workers and industrial leaders may be developing, out of
familiar materials, a new concept of industrial government.
The papers contained in America Faces the Future,3 published early in
1932, are significant contributions to the concept. Here are collected,
among other things, reports of agencies of the American Federation of
Labor and the United States Chamber of Commerce, in favor of attempts
to plan industrial development; and the statements of such different lead-
ers as Mr. Swope and Governor La Follette, agreeing on the importance of
attempts to stabilize industrial operations and employment, and improve
industrial government.
The positions of Governor La Follette and Senator La Follette may be
particularly worth recalling at this time, partly because their contribu-
tions to the growth of the idea expressed in the Recovery Act have been
less noticed recently than other contributions, and partly because thought-
ful and instructive scepticism about such legislation is a natural element
in the tradition to which they belong. Their contribution is of course only
one among the many, which, coming from various countries and various
periods of history, and from a multitude of business and government lead-
ers, created the Act. But any limited discussion of the history, terms, and
administration of the Act must be rather arbitrarily selective.
Before a special session of the Wisconsin Legislature, convened Novem-
ber 24, 1931, Governor La Follette made an address, among other things
outlining and advocating a bill "to promote the stabilization of industry."'4
The bill provided for the equalization of working hours. It further kro-
vided exemption from the state anti-trust laws for business groups associ-
a On these questions about the corporation and government see Dodd, For Whom Are Cor-
porate Managers Trustees?, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1145 (1932); Berle, For Whom Corporate Man-
agers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1365 (x932); Berle and Means, The Modern
Corporation and Private Property (1932), especially Book IV, Chapter IV. The writer's views
were briefly expressed in a book review in 22 Am. Econ. Rev. x20 (1932).
3 America Faces the Future, edited by Charles A. Beard (ist ed. 1932).
4 The bill was introduced in the Assembly by Professor Harold Groves, of the Economics
Department of the University of Wisconsin, Assemblyman from Madison; and in the Senate
by Senator Thomas Duncan of Milwaukee. The address of Governor La Follette is printed in
part in America Faces the Future, at 351.
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ated for stabilization and self-government. Each group was to be required
to submit its cooperative activities to "a public policy committee consist-
ing of not less than three members who are selected to represent the inter-
ests of the consumers, employees, and other groups distinct from, but af-
fected by," the activities of the group in question. Each group was to be
required moreover, as a condition of its privileges, to secure and keep the
approval of the Department of Agriculture and Markets and the Execu-
tive Council of the State. There had been discussion of a provision com-
pelling minority members of an industry within the state to come into
voluntary associations organized under such a law, and controlling de-
fined state markets; but no such provision was embodied in the bill.
Among other things, it was recognized that the effective operation of the
groups in question would be limited by the geographical position of this
single state. The administration bill passed the Progressive Assembly,
but was defeated by one vote in the conservative Senate.
The bill followed a course of administrative activity begun the previous
summer. Two groups of manufacturers, influenced doubtless by growing
general interest in the idea, had discussed the development of trade associ-
ation activities in conferences called by the Governor to consider the possi-
bility of various types of cooperation between industry and the state. One
group, which had some prospect of controlling its markets, gave considera-
tion to a memorandum drawn up as a result of conferences between repre-
sentatives of the industry and economic and legal advisers to the Gover-
nor. The memorandum contained this brief outline of the type of organi-
zation contemplated:
Stability is to be secured by the industry's control of production. For the protection of the
public, as much internal competition as possible, with respect to quality, service and specific
prices, should be preserved. Production, for example, might be allotted in proportion to figures
derived not only from past production, but from orders secured or available for particular
units. Moreover, to serve as a check on the power of the organized industry, it would seem nec-
essary that decisions of the industry's representatives about production, prices, and employ-
ment should be subject to examination by a body representing interests outside the industry
and affected by its policies. The industry's trustees, formulating its production policies, should
be able to satisfy an advisory group chosen to represent labor and consumers that the industry
is not following unreasonable policies. If the trustees fail to satisfy such a group, the agree-
ments of the units in the industry should cease to be binding and the industry should lose the
advantages of cooperation with the public. The industry's trustees might well be brought into
touch with investors and investment bankers contemplating new investments in the industry
through such a group. The advisory group should work in cooperation with appropriate public
agencies and should be appointed by a representative of the public. It seems unnecessary to
attempt to describe an organization in further detail; an organization following these outlines
could undoubtedly be set up in conferences between representatives of the industry and repre-
sentatives of the public.
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For a variety of reasons, the suggested organization was never effected.
The lumber manufacturers of the state, the second of the groups, did,
however, form a somewhat similar organization during the summer and
early fall, which was in effect for a year.5 It was recognized from the start
that competitive conditions in the lumber industry would limit the effec-
tiveness of such an organization, whether for harm or good. At the same
time it was thought that the creation of such an organization might be
suggestive. The preservation of competition, internal or external or both,
and the creation of a check on any possible monopoly power, were relied on
to justify such organizations under the state and federal anti-trust laws,
even without amendment.
The preservation of competition and the creation of adequate checks on
the power of manufacturers' associations were essential to any sound de-
velopment of such a scheme, in the judgment of Governor La Follette.
Similarly, Senator La Follette indicated concern about the preservation of
competition and the protection of the public, in the questions which he
asked industrial leaders who appeared before the subcommittee of the
Committee on Manufacturers of the United States Senate in the early
winter of the same year. 6 How were the efficient, low cost units of an in-
dustry to be given their legitimate opportunity to increase their fractions
of the total production under a system of manufacturers' association sta-
bilization? What sort of limits on price increases were necessary, desirable,
or possible in such a scheme? The significance of these questions is em-
phasized by current developments.
A good deal of opinion favorable to attempts at planning and stabiliza-
tion developed quietly in the year or so before President Roosevelt's in-
auguration.7 In his Commonwealth Club San Francisco speech, a philoso-
phy of industrial government was outlined by Mr. Roosevelt.8 A combina-
tion of various elements effected the drafting and passage of the Recovery
Act.
Title I of the Act authorizes voluntary and legally non-enforceable
"agreements" and enforceable "codes" binding industrial units and
5 See a note on the agreement in the American Lumberman of September 3, 1932, 38.
6 Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Manufactures United States Senate,
Seventy-Second Congress, on S. 6215 (71st Congress), A Bill to Establish a National Eco-
nomic Council (Government Printing Office, 1932), 168, 309-311, for example.
7 See for example, 32 Literary Digest 13 (April 9, 1932), 89 Collier's 54 (April 30, 1932),
99 The Wall Street Jour. x (April 6, 1932), for comments on New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U.S. 262 (1932); cf. i34 Comm. and Fin. Chron. 2209-10 (March 26, 1932).
8 New York Times, September 24, 1932, p. 6.
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groups to cooperate in efforts to stabilize and revive interstate commerce.
Opportunities for the organization of labor must be provided for in agree-
ments and codes; and they must not permit "monopolies" or "monopo-
listic practices." Provision is made for the enforcement of codes against
members of industries governed by them, by means of injunctions, crimi-
nal proceedings, and proceedings by the Federal Trade Commission. Au-
thority to cancel a code is given the President. Some protection to parties
to agreements and codes is authorized, against the effects of foreign com-
petition.
The Act was approved June I6, and for the administration of Title I an
organization was at once created by the President's order, headed by
General Johnson as administrator. The preliminary discussion of codes
with representatives of industry, and the subsequent conduct of hearings
and preliminary recommendations of approval or disapproval, were the
functions assigned to deputy administrators. These are men of business
experience, and they and their staffs do between them much of the essen-
tial work of the Administration. Advisory committees representing con-
sumers, workers, and "industry" (managers and owners) were made part
of the Administration, and their representatives are assigned to protect
the interests in question at various stages in the formation, consideration,
and administration of agreements and codes. A number of staff divisions
-public relations, administration, economic, legal-assist and advise the
deputy administrators and administrator. In particular, the Division of
Economic Research and Planning has grown into a large organization for
the study of economic problems raised by the work of the Administration,
and for the recommendation of policy to the Administration. Except as to
labor, in the food production industries the administration of the Act has
been delegated to the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. The pro-
motion of the President's Reemployment Agreements required the creation
of local and state administrative units, with which the public is familiar.
New problems have required and will continue to require the creation of
new administrative agencies, to deal with such problems as those of labor
relations, prices, and enforcement.
Labor provisions of the Cotton Textile Code, approved July 9, and pro-
duction and price provisions of the Iron and Steel Code, approved August
19, 1933, may be somewhat arbitrarily selected as indications of the prob-
lems, and their tentative solution, of industrial self-govefnment. 9
The Cotton Textile Code, among other things, reduced the maximum
9 See particularly the administrators' reports recommending approval of these codes, pub-
lished in part as footnotes to the codes in Prentice-Hall's Federal Trade and Industry Service,
12.001, 12. 891, and in full by the Government Printing Office.
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hours of labor and increased the minimum wages prevailing in the cotton
textile industry. It was recognized that a resulting increase in labor costs
would be likely to interfere with the operation of marginal mills in the
industry, and so decrease employment. To counteract this effect, as well
as to limit night work, overproduction, and price declines, it was provided
that machines could be operated only eighty hours a week in the industry.
Again, of course, the immediate effect intended was to send some orders to
relatively "uneconomic" mills, and limit employment opportunities and
production at more "economic" mills. Whether the beneficial effects of
spreading employment, eliminating bad competitive labor practices, and
limiting price declines, will prove to have outweighed the ill effects of
limiting employment opportunities and production by increasing costs
and limiting machine hours, will probably never be determined accurately,
in view of the many uncontrollable variables which affect economic
phenomena. Though members of the industry appear reasonably confi-
dent, it is, of course, possible that such a cooperative effort to control pro-
duction interferes with price adjustments essential to recovery.
Other codes have, of course, followed the Textile Code in reducing
maximum hours and increasing minimum wages, and most of them have
sought to secure compensatory market advantages by production and
price control. In such industries as coal, crude oil production, and lumber,
where competition is extreme, it seems likely that, if it can be effected,
market improvement is peculiarly desirable. In every competitive indus-
try, indeed, there seem to be persistent divisions between the relatively
efficient and the relatively inefficient, not operative in the case of monop-
olistic public utilities, which assure a degree of protection to the buyer.
In the case of a relatively closely organized industry like steel, neverthe-
less, the appearance of elaborate production and price-control code pro-
visions called for careful consideration on the part of the Administration.
In the sections of the Steel Code limiting the expansion of furnace capacity
and authorizing the industry's administrative body to control production,
there is no express provision for encouragement to progress in the form of
favor to low cost producers. And in the sections providing for open price,
basing point, rail freight, delivered prices, with authority to the industry's
administration to set minimum prices, there was little express protection
to buyers in the Code as submitted at the hearing. It was finally agreed
that the maintenance of competitive conditions in the industry should,
with other matters, be the subject of study for a ninety-day trial period, on
the part of the industry's administration and a committee of the Recovery
Administration. A provision to this effect was inserted in the Code before
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its approval,0 together with provisions making the operation of the pro-
duction and price provisions by themselves subject to the disapproval of
the President. The possibility that employment and purchasing will only
be discouraged by such efforts to control market demoralization is appar-
ent in the speculation which has appeared with respect to an increased
price level on some items under the Code. On the other hand, insistence
on lower rail prices as a condition of government financing is a reminder
that perhaps not every fall in prices prolongs a depression.
The combination of industrial groups to deal with problems of the de-
pression, the essential feature of the program of the Recovery Act, appears
a sound step, both in its immediate and permanent effects. At least the
groups in question are furnished with administrative organization for col-
lective judgment and action on any problems that may arise. On the
other hand, there may have been inadequate recognition of the inherent
limitations of such combinations in effecting quick improvement in em-
ployment and prices.
A considered judgment on the limitations of manufacturers' associa-
tions' activities has prevented Governor La Follette and Senator La
Folette from making manufacturers' association stabilization the most
important element in their programs for present industrial recovery. In-
stead they have insisted that the best means of dealing effectively with
the depression is an extensive program of public works. They have each
at the same time done perhaps as much as anyone engaged in government
to advance through preliminary stages the ideas subsequently embodied
in Title I of the Recovery Act.
In the course of the next thirty years, perhaps under the influence of
continued and renewed depression, the ideas embodied in Title I of the
Recovery Act may provide industry with a means of preventing over-
expansion (if not of curing depressions), as well as a new concept of in-
dustrial government. In the meantime, as the country knows, the most
important immediate question is whether industrial recovery is to come
naturally, aided perhaps by the Recovery Administration, or whether it
will require the aid of further collective action on the part of the country.
A number of legal questions about the Act may be presented within
the next few months. It is indeed an indication of the extraordinary spirit
of the country that business men have not generally interfered with the
experiment, by retaining lawyers to oppose it. But the questions may
eventually have to be decided. What is a "monopoly" or a "monopolis-
tic" practice; and how can the question be raised? Are "liberty" and
1o Iron and Steel Code, Article VI, § 7; Article XII, § 2.
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"property" unduly limited by the Act? How far does it and how far can it
authorize the President to exercise power in approving codes, and provid-
ing for the decencies 6f administrative procedure with a view to their
enforcement? Is the Act a regulation of "interstate commerce?" Does the
section of the Act relating to foreign trade authorize the President to pro-
tect any industry operating under an agreement or a code against any for-
eign competition?" Or is protection authorized only against trade dis-
advantages resulting only from the existence of the agreement or the code;
and is the section to be read in the light of current attempts, perhaps more
reasonable than they seem, to reconcile the work of the Recovery Ad-
ministration with the development of international cooperation? The
world wheat agreement,' 2 which may contain some suggestions for the cop-
per producers, is an indication of the position the President may take, in
coordinating his efforts for the promotion of domestic recovery and his
efforts for the promotion of world stability.
1 For a brief discussion of the sort of industrial organization provided for in the Act, and
its place in the combinations policy and constitutional tradition of the United States, see
Sharp, Movement in Supreme Court Adjudication, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 361, 397-399 (i933); id.,
593, 6ii, note 250. See also Wahrenbrock, Federal Anti-Trust Law and the National In-
dustrial Recovery Act, 31 Mich. L. Rev. xoo9 (1933). Since the enactment of the Agricul-
tural Act and the National Recovery Act, favorable judicial opinions have been expressed on
the validity of such legislation. United States v. Caliston Packers, (Equity 3627-S, Southern
Division of United States District Court, N. Dist. Cal., Oct. 2, 1933) and cases cited; People
v. Nebbia, 262 N.Y. 259, 186 N.E. 694 (i933).
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